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Venture capital investors are specialized financial intermediaries that provides funding for technological 
innovation with the goal of realizing a capital gain within a few years. We are the first to examine the 
association of venture capital funding with a company’s choice of innovation strategies. We employ a 
unique dataset of over 10,000 innovative Dutch companies, some of which received venture financing. 
The data include detailed information on patent applications, innovation activities, and other company 
characteristics. We find that companies backed by venture capital focus on the build-up of absorptive 
capacity by engaging in both in-house R&D and in the acquisition of external knowledge. Companies 
that receive public funding, instead, are able to relax their financing constraints and perform more 
innovation activities without focusing solely on absorptive capacity. Our results also suggest that the 
correlation between venture capital funding and the build-up of absorptive capacity is not only due to a 
selection effect. We derive implications of these findings for corporate strategy and public policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
Technological innovation is a major source of competitive advantage. It is a costly activity that requires 
large investments. Therefore, it may not be affordable for small and medium sized entrepreneurial 
companies, unless they manage to attract external sources of funding (Hall and Lerner (2009)). Since 
banks are by their nature reluctant to lend to risky, long-term projects (Ueda (2004)), firms that want to 
invest in innovation may have to turn to other sources of funds. A prominent source of capital for 
innovative companies is venture capital. Venture capital is a form of specialized financial intermediation 
that finances companies with the goal of realizing a capital gain by bringing them public or having them 
acquired within a few years. A distinctive trait of venture capital is the screening, monitoring, and 
advising of its portfolio companies (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008, 2009), Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989), Lerner (1995)). These non-monetary services allow venture investors to select companies with 
high growth potential and to bring some of them to success.  
 
While previous literature has examined the role of venture funding for several aspects of corporate 
strategy (see Da Rin, Hellmann, and Puri (2013) for a survey), we still know very little about the 
relationship between venture capital and innovation strategies. This is surprising, since innovation 
strategies contribute to a company’s competitive advantage (Cassiman and Veugelers (2002)). In this 
study we fill this gap, and bridge the finance and management literatures by asking whether companies 
that are financed by venture capital firms show more focus in accumulating commercially valuable 
innovation capabilities. 
 
We base our analysis on the concept of absorptive capacity, defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 
1990) as the ̀ capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge' that has been generated outside 
the firm, thereby ‘absorbing‘ it. Recent conceptualizations stress the dynamic capability nature of 
absorptive capacity that allows companies to learn from both in-house and extramural knowledge (Zahra 
and George (2002)). In this view, the routines that constitute a firm’s absorptive capacity lead to the 
creation and continuation of a competitive advantage. Absorptive capacity is then a source of 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2594904 
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competitive advantage that contributes to improving a company’s economic performance: by combining 
in-house (‘make’) and external (‘buy’) innovation activities, firms are able to produce more and better 
innovations. In fact, absorptive capacity has been shown to be beneficial to both innovation and product 
market performance (Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), Engelen et al. (2014)), a result that holds also in 
our data: firms that engage in ‘Make-And-Buy’ obtain a higher percentage of their sales from innovative 
products. The implications for corporate strategy of understanding which variables may lead to the 
build-up of absorptive capacity are therefore potentially important. Studying the association between 
venture financing and absorptive capacity can therefore improve our understanding of how the source 
of finance is related to the innovation strategy of entrepreneurial companies. 
  
Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), we consider four innovation strategies that consist of 
exclusive combinations of two innovation activities: in-house R&D (‘Make’), and the acquisition of 
external knowledge in the form of R&D, patents, and other know-how (‘Buy’). The resulting strategies 
are: ‘No-Make-No-Buy,’ ‘Buy-Only,’ ‘Make Only,’ and ‘Make-And-Buy.’  We focus on the ‘Make-
And-Buy’ strategy that is often used as an empirical correspondent of the concept of ‘absorptive 
capacity’). Our hypothesis is based on venture investors having a tight time frame for exiting their 
investments, since they commit to return money back to their financial sponsors within a few years. This 
creates a pressure to invest in companies that are likely to quickly turn their innovations into products. 
We therefore expect a positive association between venture capital and the build-up of absorptive 
capacity, i.e. with a Make-And-Buy strategy.  
 
We base our analysis on a unique database of over 10,000 Dutch companies that engage in innovation 
activities. Of these, 161 receive venture financing, mostly for expansion purposes. This compares well 
to the US sample of Puri and Zarutskie (2012), in which venture-backed companies are 0.1% of the 
population of US new companies. Puri and Zarutskie (2012) also show that venture-backed companies 
account for a disproportionate share of job creation and sales: 5% to 7% of total employment 2001-
2005, and compared to a matched sample, they have twice as many employees and sales five years after 
receiving funding.  The Netherlands represents a suitable research ground for our study, since it is the 
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second European country in terms of patents per capita (European Patent Office (2013)) and the second 
largest venture capital market in the European Union in per capita terms (EVCA (2012)). Our dataset 
combines three sources of data. First, we obtain detailed firm-level information on innovation activities 
from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data provided by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS). We then augment these data with information on venture financing from ThomsonOne, the 
leading commercial database for venture finance, and with patent application-level information from the 
PATSTAT database of the European Patent Office. The resulting database is both unique and novel. 
 
An important feature of the CIS database is that it allows us to to include in the analysis firms’ access 
to public funds granted to companies that develop new technology. Public funds aim at helping 
technology-based companies overcome credit constraints that may deter them from innovating, without 
immediate regard to their profitability. Public funds, therefore, do not put on companies the same 
pressure for immediate commercial viability as venture investors. By controlling for access to public 
funds, we are then able to disentangle the strategic guidance role of venture capital from the sheer 
provision of money to innovative companies. In Section 4 we discuss to what extent such guidance and 
pressure are likely to be socially beneficial. 
 
We first document, in univariate analysis, that venture-backed companies have different characteristics 
than other companies, both those that receive public funds but no venture capital, and those that do not 
receive any of the two sources of funding. They have higher sales, consistent with Eckhardt, Shane, and 
Delmar (2006), and are more likely to operate in high-tech industries. They have also produced more 
patents before receiving financing, consistent with Hsu and Ziedonis (2013), Haeussler, Harhoff, and 
Mueller (2014), and Lahr and Mina (2016), who show that patents are a good predictor of venture 
funding. Venture-backed companies are more often engaged in the build-up of absorptive capacity, 
while companies that receive only public funds are relatively more often engaged in developing only in-
house R&D. Venture-backed companies are more aggressive in protecting their intellectual property 
through patents, trademarks and industrial design, and have a higher percentage of sales from newly 




We then turn to a multivariate analysis; our central result is that companies with venture investors are 
more likely to engage in the Make-And-Buy strategy, but not in Buy-Only or Make-Only. Venture-
backed companies are 16.8% more likely to choose the Make-And-Buy innovation strategy than 
companies with no venture funding. Venture-backed companies are also not more likely to engage in 
pure in-house R&D. This points to venture funding relentlessly pursuing companies that build up 
absorptive capacity. Public funds, on the other hand, are also associated to  companies that engage purely 
in in-house R&D, suggesting that they are effective in relaxing financial constraints. These results are 
robust to several variations in the assumptions underlying the econometric analysis, and are consistent 
with the relatively short investment horizon of venture capital investors. It also points to a 
complementarity between public funds, which finance a large number of technologically skilled 
companies, and venture capital, which selectively picks those that are better positioned for fast 
commercialization (see also Bertoni and Tykvová (2015)). 
 
The association of venture capital with absorptive capacity may derive from venture capital firms’ ability 
to select promising companies as well as from their influence on these companies, both of which respond 
to the need to generate financial returns in a relatively short time span. Our data do not allow separating 
these ‘selection’ and ‘treatment’ effects of venture capital, since we cannot rely on time- or space-based 
instrumental variables to disentangle selection from treatment. However, we can exploit the variation in 
the innovation strategies of 30 companies for which we have information both before and after the 
venture capital investment. The patterns we observe are consistent with venture capital selecting 
companies that are already building absorptive capacity, but also pushing companies in that direction 
after investing. Both the 'selection' (screening) and the 'treatment’ (monitoring and advising) aspects 
therefore appear to contribute to the difference between venture capital and other forms of finance 
(Sørensen (2007)). 
 
Several studies, using European and US data, have found that venture capital backed companies tend to 
have superior performance in producing commercially successful new technology  (e.g., Bottazzi and 
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Da Rin (2002), Engel and Keilbach (2007), and Hellmann and Puri (2000)). The correlation we 
document advances our understanding of how such performance may be achieved and provide an 
explanation consistent with the positive effect of absorptive capacity with commercialization 
documented by Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) 
 
The link between funding sources and innovation strategy has implications for corporate strategy. From 
a strategy perspective, our results imply that companies that seek venture capital need to develop a 
technology base that prepares them to incorporate external technology. Receiving public funds can be a 
first step in this direction. They also suggest that venture capital investors are likely to push their 
companies towards the incorporation of external knowledge. Both effects are consistent with the 
anecdotal evidence collected by Bhidé (2008).  
 
Our results can also inform public policy. Governments spend large amounts of public money on 
promoting innovation and entrepreneurship, including support for venture capital firms (see Da Rin, 
Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006) and Hall and van Reenen (2000) for a discussion).1 Our results point 
to venture capital being effective for supporting the rapid creation of commercially successful innovative 
companies. At the same time, as we discuss in the conclusion, the relatively short-term horizon of 
venture investors comes with shortcomings as well.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework that 
guides and motivate our analysis. Section 3 presents the data and variables. Section 4 presents and 
discusses our results. Section 5 reports our robustness checks, and is followed by a conclusion.   
 
  
                                                     
1 For a debate on the effectiveness of such policies, and on evidence that they result in the entry of 'churning' 
companies which fail to develop and innovate see Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2010), Kerr and Nanda 
(2010), and Shane (2008). 
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2. Literature and Hypotheses 
We start by examining the concept of absorptive capacity and the working of venture capital. From this, 
we derive our hypotheses on the association between a company’s sources of finance and its innovation 
strategies that guide our empirical strategy. 
 
The concept of absorptive capacity was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) to identify a 
company’s capability to exploit knowledge generated outside its boundaries. The theoretical argument 
is that in-house R&D activities have two different effects, or ‘faces.’ One is that R&D allows companies 
to directly generate new innovations, the other is that R&D provides companies with the ability to 
‘identify, assimilate, and exploit’ know-how that has been generated outside them, thereby ‘absorbing‘ 
it. Internal know-how provides the company with the capability of incorporating external knowledge 
into the development of successful innovations (see Arora and Gambardella (1990, 1994), Cockburn 
and Henderson (1998) and Freeman (1991)).  
 
Absorptive capacity has attracted growing attention in empirical studies (see Lane et al. (2006)). Recent 
theoretical formalizations frame absorptive capacity as a dynamic capability that allows companies to 
learn from knowledge generated both in-house and acquired from outside the company (Kamien and 
Zang (2000), Zahra and George (2002)).2 In particular, Zahra and George (2002) include into absorptive 
capacity the ‘transformation’ that comes from recombining internal and external knowledge. 
Transformation creates the possibility to recognize innovation opportunities (McGrath, MacMillan, and 
Venkataraman (1995)) and to build the cognitive bases to exploit them, shaping in this way the firm’s 
competitive strategy (Zahra, Ireland, and Hitt (2000)).3 Zahra and George (2002) therefore conceptualize 
absorptive capacity as ‘a set of organizational routines and processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, 
transform, and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational capability.’  
                                                     
2 See also Leahy and Neary (2007) for an analysis of the economic policy implications of absorptive capacity. 
3 Narrative studies have since long provided anecdotal evidence on the importance of transformation for successful 
innovation. For instance, Mueller (1962) shows that fifteen of the 25 major discoveries introduced into the United 
States by DuPont, originated with work done outside the company, despite the company's substantial investments 
in path-breaking research. Johnston and Gibbons (1975) argue that information obtained from outside the company 




From our perspective, the dynamic nature of absorptive capacity allows companies to exploit their 
knowledge base (internal as well as acquired) to reconfigure their resources in response to changes in a 
company’s environment. In this sense, absorptive capacity is a source of competitive advantage that 
contributes to improving a company’s economic performance, as documented by Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002, 2006), Lane and Lubatkin (1998), Lenox and King (2004), and Spender (1996).  
Absorptive capacity therefore helps explain why the incorporation of knowledge from external sources 
leads to an increase of in-house R&D (Veugelers (1997)) and of productivity (Allen (1986), Levin and 
Reiss (1988)). In fact, companies that accumulate absorptive capacity are better positioned to benefit 
from external knowledge, and therefore to outperform rivals in terms of innovation performance (Tsai 
(2001)).  
 
In our empirical analysis, we follow Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), and we consider that a firm pursues 
an innovation strategy of building absorptive capacity when it undertakes in-house R&D and also 
acquires external knowledge (‘Make-And-Buy’ strategy). Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) argue that 
understanding which variables lead to a build-up of absorptive capacity would help making the 
innovation process a `manageable source of sustainable competitive advantage.' We provide a 
contribution in this direction, and investigate whether the build-up of absorptive capacity, the ‘Make-
And-Buy’ strategy, is related to a company’s sources of finance. The importance of the source of finance 
has been attracting growing attention in the finance and management literatures. For example, Hellmann 
(2002) shows that the strategic goals of corporate investors differ from those of venture capital firms. 
Ueda (2004) shows that banks are less suitable than venture capital firms for financing high-risk 
entrepreneurial projects. David, O’Brien, and Yoshikawa (2008) show that transactional debt is less 
congruent with R&D activities than relational debt.  
 
We focus in particular on the role of venture capital, which is a form of finance that is especially suitable 
for innovative companies (Casamatta (2003)). Venture capital firms are specialized investors that raise 
money from pension funds, endowments, and other institutional investors. This occurs through 
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investment vehicles (‘funds’) that make equity investments in innovative companies with high growth 
potential (see Sahlman (1990) for a detailed analysis). To mitigate agency conflicts, venture funds have 
a finite life, typically ten years. They invest in their early years and then move to reap the fruits of their 
investments before they are liquidated and return money to investors. Funds’ finite life span forces them 
to invest in companies that can quickly grow up to become ripe within a relatively short time, typically 
five years (Gompers and Lerner (2001)).  
 
Venture capital firms are therefore specialized in identifying and supporting companies that can have a 
strong potential for relatively fast commercialization of their products, so that they can be 'exited’ within 
a few years by being listed on a stock exchange or sold to an industrial acquirer (see also Dutta (2015)). 
Venture capitalists cannot afford investing in companies whose expected commercial maturation is far 
away. When selecting their portfolio companies, venture firms focus on companies that have provided 
tangible signs of technological maturity. Eckhardt, Shane, and Delmar (2006) find that venture investors 
are more likely to finance companies that have already shown ‘verifiable indicators of venture 
development’ such as marketing activities and sales. Several studies have also shown that VCs use 
patents as screening signals (Baum and Silverman (2004), Hsu and Ziedonis, (2013), Mann, and Sager, 
(2007)). By contrast, Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014) find that corporate venture investors are 
more patient and invest in companies that eventually result technologically more innovative. We 
therefore expect venture investors to be attracted by companies that have already started to build-up 
absorptive capacity.4 
 
The need to exit their investments within a tight timeframe makes venture capital firms be active 
investors and put pressure on their companies to reach commercial maturity. Several studies document 
the effect of venture capital firms’ active involvement on different company strategies. These include 
the professionalization of the management team (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008), Hellmann and 
                                                     
4 One can therefore think of venture investors as ‘growth accelerators’ aiming at quickly commercial success. 
Interestingly, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) find that US venture-backed companies grow faster than a comparable set 
of companies in the years of venture investment, but the gap vanishes after venture investors exit. Moreover, the 
failure rate of these two groups of companies is similar after the exit of venture investors, while it was lower for 
venture-backed companies during the VC investment period.  
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Puri (2002)), the formation of strategic alliances (Lindsey (2008) and of R&D alliances (Colombo, 
Grilli, and Piva (2006), the degree of product innovation (Hellmann and Puri (2000)) and 
commercialization cooperation (Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002), Hsu (2006)).5 Absorptive capacity is 
congruent with venture capital firms’ need for realizing their capital gain within few years from 
investing, because it makes it more likely for a company to innovate successfully.6 We therefore expect 
venture-backed companies to be more likely to invest in absorptive capacity than companies that rely 
on other sources of finance. Our study is the first to look into the relationship between venture capital 
and innovation strategies.7 Several companies in our sample receive public funds. These represent a 
passive form of finance that innovative companies can often access thanks to their technological 
prowess. However, they do not target commercially ambitious firms. By controlling for access to public 
funds, we can then control for the extent to which firms manage to overcome credit constraints. This 
allows us to document the role of venture capital on top of the sheer provision of finance.  
 
Finally, we note that understanding how the source of finance is related to the accumulation of 
absorptive capacity, whether by selecting companies that have begun building absorptive capacity or by 
pushing companies to accumulate absorptive capacity, is important also from a policy perspective. 
Building on the theoretical contribution of Aghion and Howitt (2002), Griffith, Redding, and van 
Reenen (2004) provide country-level evidence of the importance of absorptive capacity for productivity 




                                                     
5 Studies also find a stronger propensity to patent by venture-backed companies (e.g. Kortum and Lerner (2000)), 
though this has not been confirmed in the European context (Engel and Keilbach (2007). Lahr and Mina (2016)) 
also show that venture capital firms use patents as a screening device; they also find that patenting does not increase 
after venture financing. This could reflect venture investors pushing companies to patent because they are known 
to be more likely to invest in that case. However, such an interpretation is not supported by the results of Kortum 
and Lerner (2000). 
6 Bhidé (2008) provides narrative evidence that companies that obtain venture finance have often demonstrated 
prior evidence of an ‘incipient technological advantage’ (see, for instance, p.28). 
7 There is a large literature on the effects of VC funding for portfolio companies; see Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri 
(2013) for an extensive survey. 
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3. The Data  
3.1 Data sources 
We base our analysis on a unique company-level database of Dutch companies. The Netherlands 
represents an appealing research ground for our purposes, since it is the second European country in 
terms of patents per capita (European Patent Office (2013)) and the second largest venture capital market 
in the European Union in per capita terms, second only to the UK (EVCA (2012)). 
 
We collect our data from three sources. First, we use innovation and company data from the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS).8 Since 1993, the CIS takes place every four years in all countries of the 
European Union to investigate companies' innovation activities. Information is gathered by national 
statistical offices through a survey that covers a representative sample of companies (innovative and 
not) stratified along the region, sector, and size dimensions.9  CIS data are published only in aggregate 
form to preserve respondents' anonymity. However, the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) allows 
qualified researchers to gain access to (anonymous) company-level information. We use data from four 
survey waves: CIS-3, covering 1998-2000, CIS-3.5, covering 2000-2002, CIS-4, covering 2002-2004, 
and CIS-4.5, covering 2004-2006. Waves CIS-3.5 and CIS-4.5 were carried out by the CBS using mostly 
the same format as in the previous Europe-wide wave. About 10,000 Dutch companies are included in 
each survey wave, and over 28,600 companies surveyed over these four waves. 
 
Our second source of data is the ThomsonOne database published by Thomson Financial, a division of 
Reuters. ThomsonOne is the main commercial source of venture capital and private equity investment 
data, and has been extensively used in studies of venture capital financing  (e.g., Gompers et al. (2005), 
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), and Sørensen (2007)). ThomsonOne is compiled from 
information provided directly by venture capital firms, and contains data at the level of the individual 
                                                     
8 CIS data have been used in several studies. For example, Mairesse and Mohnen (2002) and Belderbos et al. 
(2004) use the Dutch survey, Frenza and Ietto-Gillies (2009) use the UK survey, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002, 
2006) use the Belgian survey, Griffith et al. (2006) use data for France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, and Lorenz 
et al.(2007) use the whole European survey. 




investment. For the Netherlands it includes (for the period under study) more than 1,000 investments 
made by nearly 300 venture firms in over 600 companies. 
 
Our third source is the PATSTAT database developed by the OECD and the European Patent Office 
(EPO).10  From PATSTAT we obtain information on the individual patent applications filed with the 
European Patent Office by Dutch companies.  
 
3.2 Dataset construction 
Building our dataset involved two major steps: (i) aggregating information from different CIS waves for 
each company, and (ii) merging the information from the CIS, ThomsonOne and PATSTAT databases. 
 
Because we are interested in innovative companies, we restrict our sample to companies that have 
introduced either a product or a process innovation or that report undertaking any of the innovation 
activities listed in the CIS survey in any of the waves they took part in.11 This reduces our sample from 
28,600 to 10,371 companies. Of these, 51% take part in only one wave, 26% in two waves, 14% in three 
waves and 9% in all four waves. We aggregate the information of firms that participate in more than 
one wave, so that we have one observation per company in the final dataset. We also aggregate so as to 
ensure an accurate recording of innovation activities. Consider a company, which starts doing intramural 
R&D in December 2000 and buys a patent in January 2001; these two activities would fall in different 
CIS waves, but are clearly related, and indeed closer than if they had taken place at two distant dates 
within the same CIS wave (say February 1998 and November 2000). Since we do not know the exact 
timing of each innovation activity, but only that it happened within the three years covered by the survey 
wave, we consider the company actively engaged in an innovation activity if it is ever active across the 
CIS waves it takes part in. With this approach, we are able to exploit the richness of our data and to 
                                                     
10 We obtain the PATSTAT data from EPIP (http://www.epip.eu/datacentre.php). Information on PATSTAT is 
available from the EPO website: http://forums.epo.org/patstat. Notice that EPO data refer to patent applications, 
while US Patent Office data refer to patent grants. 
11 These seven innovation activities are: intramural R&D, extramural R&D, acquisition of other external 
knowledge, acquisition of machinery, equipment and software, personnel training, activities for market 
introduction and other procedures. Respondents are asked to report those activities only when they are undertaken 
for ‘the development of new or significantly improved products or processes.’  
12 
 
obtain a more accurate picture of companies' innovation strategies than with a purely cross-sectional 
dataset.  In order to account for the fact that we have richer information for companies that take part in 
multiple waves, in the robustness section we also include a set of 15 dummies that control for the 
combinations of waves a company participates in. 
 
The second step in the dataset construction consists of matching the data from the CIS with the data 
from ThomsonOne and PATSTAT. With this goal, we identify Dutch venture-backed companies and 
Dutch companies that filed applications with the EPO. To merge these companies with those in the CIS 
datasets we exploit the fact that the Dutch Chamber of Commerce assigns each Dutch company a unique 
identifier. This number is used in the CIS to identify companies. As ThomsonOne does not contain this 
information, we looked up in the Chamber of Commerce website the identifier for each company that 
received venture funding, using an algorithm based on the company name, city, address, and sector. By 
joining the Chamber of Commerce identifier of CIS respondents with that of the venture-backed 
companies, CBS could then precisely identify all venture-backed companies in the CIS database. Our 
sample contains 161 such companies. Identification of patent applicants was obtained in the same way. 
The sample was then anonymized by CBS by replacing the Chamber of Commerce identification 
numbers with random ones. 
 
3.3 Variables 
In this section we describe the variables we use in the empirical analysis. Table 1 provides formal 
definitions, and reports the mean value (or frequency) and the standard deviation for all variables. 
 
3.3.1 Innovation strategies  
We build our dependent variables from the two innovation activities: Make and Buy. Make consists of 
doing intramural R&D to develop technology within the firm. Buy consists of acquiring technology 
from outside the firm, ‘extramural R&D,’ and it includes two different types of purchases. The first is 
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the purchase of R&D from external sources, and the second is the purchase or licensing of patents, or of 
other inventions or forms of disembodied knowledge, generated outside of the firm.12   
    
Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) we aggregate innovation activities into four mutually 
exclusive innovation strategies. The baseline category is No-Make-No-Buy; this occurs when a 
company does not engage in any innovation activity. This group is made up of companies that report 
having introduced a product or process, but do not currently engage in neither Make nor Buy, 
presumably because they did so in the past. A company belongs to this group also if it reports (i) 
undertaking acquisition of machinery, equipment and software, (ii) personnel training, (iii) activities for 
market introduction, or (iv) other procedures (see footnote 10). Make-Only and Buy-Only are strategies 
that consist of only one innovation activity, intramural or extramural R&D, respectively. Finally, Make-
and-Buy is the strategy of combining the two innovation activities, in-house R&D and external 
knowledge acquisition, and corresponds to the build-up of absorptive capacity. 
 
Our focus on innovation strategies relies on absorptive capacity being important for company 
performance. To this purpose, Table 2 reports the distribution of companies across innovation strategies 
(column I), and the distribution of three measures of innovation and commercial outcomes across 
innovation strategies (columns II to IV). Column I shows that Make-And-Buy is the most frequent 
strategy, adopted by over a third of the firms in the sample. Buy-Only is the least frequent strategy. 
Almost 30% of the firms in our sample are not conducting innovation activity at the time of answering 
the Survey. Importantly, similar to Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), Table 2 shows that Make-And-Buy 
is the strategy that ranks always at the top of all the  innovation and commercial outcome measures, 
consistent with this strategy providing companies with a competitive advantage. The strategy that comes 
second is Make-Only and the worst performers are Buy-Only and No-Make-No-Buy. 
 
 
                                                     
12 Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) we do not include in the construction of innovation strategies the 
acquisition of know-how ̀ embodied' in machinery and equipment because it is not clear whether this activity refers 
to technology acquisition or just to the purchase of means of production. 
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3.3.2 Independent variables 
All our independent variables are measured at the company level and are obtained from the Community 
Innovation Survey, the Business Register of the CBS, ThomsonOne, or the PATSTAT database of the 
EPO. Our explanatory variable of main interest is Venture-Capital, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company has received venture financing anytime until December 2006, and 0 otherwise. The majority 
of the venture-backed companies received ‘expansion’ (or ‘growth’) financing from their venture capital 
firms, consistent with the fact that European venture capital tends to be focused on this type of deals 
(Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002)). Our sample is therefore largely composed by relatively mature 
entrepreneurial companies that engage in innovation activities for which external funding is necessary.  
 
Innovative companies are likely to be credit rationed due to the riskiness of their activity, the lack of 
track record, or the presence of large agency costs (see Carpenter and Petersen (2002), Hall (2002), and 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)). The availability of public funds can therefore be an important source 
of financing (Hall and van Reenen (2000)). Public-Funds is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
received national or European public funds in any of the CIS waves it took part in,  0 otherwise. We 
obtain this information directly from the CIS. We find that 3,208 companies receive public funding in 
our sample. Of these, 91 also receive VC funding. Finally, 7,093 companies receive neither form of 
funding.  
 
Company age is an important variable for determining corporate strategy and the ability to reach out to 
external resource providers (Hsu (2006)). We obtain data on each company’s founding date from the 
Business Register database of CBS. We then compute the number of years until the time of its first 
venture financing (if venture-backed), or until the end of the first CIS wave it has responded to (if non 
venture-backed). We also control for firm size to capture a company's ability to mobilize resources. We 
measure size with the company’s sales in the last year of the first CIS wave it took part in.  
  
Since we do not have information on the pre-funding levels of innovation, it is important that we control 
indirectly for how innovative a company was before the arrival of the venture firm. For this, we use a 
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standard measure of innovation output, patents. We have patent data that is particularly suited for this 
purpose, since it contains the entire universe of patent applications filed with the EPO, therefore 
providing a set of patent applications that are arguably of higher value than those filed at the purely 
national level. Our main patent measure (Patent-Family-Size) is the number of patent applications filed 
with both the EPO and non-EPO patent offices. This is a common measure of patent quality, which 
counts the total number of applications at different patent offices (see Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2007)). 
We also use several alternative measures. One is the number of EPO patent applications filed by each 
company (Patents-EPO). A second is the number of 3-year forward citations received by the company's 
patent applications filed with the EPO (Patents-EPO-Citations), another common measure of patent 
quality (see Harhoff et al. (1999) and Trajtenberg (1990)). We aggregate the patent applications made 
to the EPO by each company taking into account the year of application. For each company that does 
not receive venture funding, we add the number of applications submitted during the six-year period 
from 1992 to 1997; this period ends just before the starting year of the first CIS wave. For each company 
that receives venture funding, we sum up the number of patent applications in the six-year period before 
the year of the first round of VC funding. We follow the same procedure when building our measures 
of patent quality.13   
 
Previous studies show that an industry’s R&D orientation affects the innovation activities of its 
companies (e.g., Colombo and Garrone (1996), Röller, Tombak, and Siebert (1997)); industry is also 
important for the venture investors’ decision (Puri and Zarutskie (2012). In our analysis we control for 
the industry a company operates in. In our main regression, we aggregate this information into a dummy 
variable, which naturally lends itself to interpretation. We define as High-Tech those companies that 
operate in the following NACE 2-digit industries: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Electronics, Computer 
Services, and R&D Services. We obtain the necessary information from the CIS; 14.8% of the 
companies operate in these industries. In the robustness section we replace High-Tech with industry 
fixed effects. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these fixed effects. 
 
                                                     
13 Our results do not change if we use for venture-backed companies the same criterion as for the other companies. 
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3.3.3 Other variables 
In Panel D of Table 1 we consider three innovation outcomes to evaluate the effectiveness of different 
innovation strategies. The first is whether the company applied for protection of its property rights in 
the form of a patent, trademark, copyright or industrial design (IPR-Protection-Application). This 
variable aims to capture the fact that successful innovations are often protected through IPR, and in this 
sense, it represents a measure of innovation performance. These forms of IPR have been shown to be 
valuable for innovation and commercialization.14 Almost a third of the companies in our sample seek 
IPR protection for their products or processes. About half of these applications is due to patents, more 
precisely 15.5%. 
 
The next two variables are the fraction of sales a company that derives from the introduction of products 
that are new to the market (Sales-Product-New-To-Market), or that are new to the firm (Sales-Product-
New-To-Firm). We take the highest fraction across all waves the company participated in. These 
variables aim at capturing the degree to which innovation is associated with the introduction of 
commercially more ambitious products. We note that a substantial amount of sales is obtained by new 
products (see Table 1). As expected, the percentage of sales of products new to the market is lower than 
the percentage of sales of products new to the firm.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
We start our analysis by looking at the characteristics of the companies in our sample, also in order to 
motivate the set of explanatory variables in our regression model. In Table 3 we compare companies 
that receive venture capital (Venture-Capital, column I) to: (i) those which receive public funds but no 
venture capital (Public-Funds-Only, column II), and to (ii) those which do not receive either type of 
financing (Other, column III) and are therefore more likely to be financially constrained. About half 
                                                     
14 See Mendonca et al. (2004), and Nabil, Landry, and Traoré (2008) for trademarks; Audretsch, Brönte, and 
Mahagaonkar (2012) for industrial design, the literature on patenting is very large, see Hall and Harhoff (2012) 
for a recent survey. 
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(56%) of the venture-backed companies also receive public funds. In Panel A, we report the median 
(frequency for dummy variables) and the standard deviation. Next to columns II and III, we indicate 
whether these companies differ from venture-backed ones in a statistically significant way. Our main 
comparison in this Section is between companies that receive venture capital and those that receive only 
public funds; the latter do not seem to be cash constrained and therefore constitute a better comparison 
benchmark that those with no funding.  
 
Panel A.1 of Table 3 looks at company characteristics. Venture-backed companies are younger than 
other companies, though not in a statistically significant way. Since they are also larger, they are likely 
to have already achieved faster growth, consistent with with the results of Eckhardt, Shane, and Delmar 
(2006). They are also significantly (economically and statistically) more likely to operate in a high-tech 
industry.  
 
Panel A.2 looks at innovation strategies. Companies that do not receive external funding are more likely 
to engage in no innovation activity or to engage in Buy-Only than venture-backed companies. They are 
also less likely to engage in Make-And-Buy. Moreover, venture-backed companies are less likely to 
limit themselves to in-house R&D compared to companies that receive only public funds, and more 
likely to combine this internal R&D with the purchase of external know-how.15 This suggests that 
venture capital is associated with companies that are not only undertaking in-house R&D, but are also 
active in incorporating external knowledge, a result we further examine in the multivariate analysis.  
 
Panel A.3 looks at different innovation outcomes. Venture-backed companies have a higher fraction of 
their sales coming from new products than companies in the other two groups do. This is true for 
products that are new to the firm, like in Cassiman and Veugelers (2006). Moreover, the result holds 
also for products that are new to the market, i.e., that have not yet been introduced in the market by other 
companies. Products that are new to the market are likely to have higher economic value, and are 
                                                     
15 The stronger use of the Make-And-Buy strategy by venture-backed companies is confirmed by the fact that the 
correlation between Make and Buy activities is (statistically significantly) higher for these companies (0.34) than 
for those that receive only public funds (0.26). 
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therefore more likely to increase profits, though this does not necessarily imply enduring long-term 
commercial success. Finally, venture-backed companies are also substantially more likely to apply for 
IPR protection in any of the CIS waves, in the form of patents, trademarks, copyrights or designs, than 
the other two groups of companies, consistent with Kortum and Lerner (2000).  
 
Panel B of Table 3 looks at the patent variables that we build using EPO data. The number and quality 
indicators for patents are highly skewed, being zero for most companies; most patent activity takes place 
in the fourth quartile of the distribution (see Table 2 in Hsu and Ziedonis (2012) for similar evidence). 
Therefore, we report mean instead of median values. The EPO patent variables measure how innovative 
the company was in the six years before the beginning of the sample period (or before a venture-backed 
company received its first round of funding), and therefore provide a measure of the company’s pre-
existing level of innovation activity. Specifically, these variables measure the number and the quality of 
patent applications during the six-year period up to 1998 (or before the first VC round, for venture-
backed companies). We find that companies with no funding have a substantially lower number of 
patents and of patent quality indicators than other companies. Venture-backed companies have a higher 
number of EPO patents than companies that receive only public funds, more than twice as many. The 
number of forward citations, a common measure of patent quality, is about twice as large, but is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. The same applies to Patents-Family-Size. These findings 
suggest that venture capital is more likely to be associated with companies that have already shown 
some innovative capability Hsu and Ziedonis (2013). This could also be due to venture capital investing 
in high-tech industries, which have higher propensity to patent. 
 
Overall, the data reflect systematic differences between venture-backed companies and the other 
companies, including those that receive public funds. Younger, faster-growing venture-backed 
companies appear to be more focused on the build-up of absorptive capacity, and to enjoy a higher share 
of their revenue from newly introduced products. Whether these facts persist when controlling for other 




4.2 Multivariate analysis 
We move to a regression analysis and use a multinomial probit regression to identify which factors are 
associated with the adoption of different innovation strategies. As explained in Section 3.3.1 we consider 
four mutually exclusive strategies: Make-and-Buy, Make-Only, Buy-Only, and No-Make-No-Buy.16  
 
To make sure that the innovation activities are dated after the first round of venture capital investment, 
in the case of companies that receive VC funding, we aggregate the innovation information only from 
waves that take place after the date of the first funding round. For this reason, we rename the strategies: 
Make-and-Buy-Post, Make-Only-Post, Buy-Only-Post, and No-Make-No-Buy-Post. 
 
Table 4 reports the marginal effects, and their significance levels, evaluated at the mean values of all 
independent variables. Columns I through III report results for three innovation strategies as No–Make–
No–Buy-Post strategy is the residual (omitted) category. Our main variable of interest is Venture-
Capital. The marginal effect of this variable indicates the change in the probability of an innovation 
strategy when a company receives venture capital funding. Since we control for whether the company 
receives public funds, the marginal effect of Venture-Capital indicates the change in the probability after 
accounting for the presence of other sources of funding that help firms overcome credit constraints. The 
marginal effects of Public-Funds are also of interest in themselves. 
 
We include several other control variables. First, we use the pre-existent quality of patent applications 
to control for a firm’s innovation propensity (Patents-Family-Size). Second, we control for sales and for 
company age to account for basic determinants of corporate innovation strategies. We also include a 
control for whether the company operates in a high-tech industry. For the three continuous variables—
company age, company size, and patent family size—we use log transformations to account for the 
presence of outliers. 
 
                                                     
16 In the robustness section we also employ a multinomial logit regression that yields very similar results.   
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Table 4 shows that the estimated marginal effect of venture capital financing on Make-And-Buy is 
positive and significant, while the estimated marginal effects of venture capital on the other innovation 
strategies are not significantly different from zero. This result indicates that venture capital focuses on 
companies that are characterized by the build-up of absorptive capacity. In particular, the probability of 
a Make-And-Buy strategy increases by 16.8% when a company receives venture capital funds. Given 
that the predicted probability of Make-And-Buy is 38%, the likelihood of this strategy increases by 44% 
when a company is venture-backed. This result holds after controlling for the availability of public 
funds, and reveals a different pattern between companies backed by venture capital funds and by public 
funds. Specifically, the results suggest that Public-Funds support companies that develop in-house R&D, 
irrespective of whether this innovation activity is combined with the acquisition of external knowledge; 
companies that receive Public-Funds are more likely to engage in both Make-Only and Make-and-Buy 
innovation strategies. Therefore, venture-backed companies can be seen as developers of new 
knowledge as well as integrators of externally generated knowledge (see Bhidé (2008: 25-27)). Venture 
capital is therefore associated with companies whose innovation strategies put together intramural and 
extramural innovation activities,  and so build-up absorptive capacity. This is our central result, which 
is consistent with the venture capital firms’ need to invest in companies that can achieve commercial 
viability relatively quickly, in order to provide returns to the institutional investors from which they 
raise money. Focus on the Make-And-Buy strategy is one way through which this goal can be reached. 
The fact that Public Funds are positively associated with internal R&D is consistent with a focus on the 
creation of new knowledge without a tight deadline. In this sense, public funds are more ‘patient’ than 
venture capital. One possible interpretation of our results is that public funds and venture capital are 
complementary sources of finance. The former invest in a large number of companies that pursue 
innovation without an immediate commercial upside. The latter focus on those companies, some of 
which also receive public funds, whose innovation strategies are more conducive to commercialization 
in the short term.  
 
Additional insights for the interpretation of these results come from the other explanatory variables. 
Companies in high-tech industries are more likely to engage in Make-Only and Make-And-Buy. This is 
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what one would expect from companies that choose to operate in technologically innovative industries. 
Increasing size and raising the number of pre-existing number of quality patents has a positive and 
significant effect on the probability of building absorptive capacity. Finally, after controlling for the 
mentioned factors, an increase in the company’s age decreases the probability of Make-And-Buy, 
indicating that younger companies may be more prone to build up absorptive capacity. 
 
In Table 5 we also compute the marginal effects for two different firm profiles: the “young and small” 
and the “old and large.” For the first profile, we compute the marginal effects at the 25th percentile for 
company age and size, and at the median for all other explanatory variables. For the second profile, we 
compute the marginal effects at the 75th percentile for company age and size, and at the median for all 
other explanatory variables. The purpose of this exercise is to provide an assessment of how financing 
sources may affect different groups of companies. Looking at the “young and small” and the “old and 
large” seems particularly salient since the former are those more likely in need of external finance, while 
the latter may be able to generate financing through retained earnings. The Table shows that the results 
remain qualitatively very similar to those of Table 4, with only very slight changes in magnitude. The 
effects of venture capital remain virtually unchanged, and those for public funds are slightly larger for 
Make-Only and slightly smaller for Make-And-Buy for the ‘young and small’ companies’ profile. 
Overall, we conclude that the association of the source of finance with innovation strategies is quite 
stable across the distribution of company characteristics. 
 
4.3 Causality and selection effects  
Our results show a strong association between venture capital and the build-up of absorptive capacity. 
Such correlation is a novel and interesting result from both a strategy and a policy perspective. It may 
derive from venture capital firm’s ability to select promising companies as well as from their influence 
on these companies. One would therefore like to separately identify the part of this correlation that is 
due to a selection effect, and the part that is due to a causal effect (as in Sørensen (2007)). Our data are 
not rich enough to allow the conclusive identification of a causal effect, since we cannot rely on time- 
or space-based instrumental variables. What we can do, however, is to exploit the variation that we have 
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in innovation strategies for the 30 observations where we have information both before and after the 
company received venture finance.  
 
We report the results in Table 6, where we tabulate the number of companies employing each of the 
four innovation strategies. Column I reports data for the pre-venture finance period, and column II for 
the post-venture finance period. Two results stand out. First, the majority (60%) of venture-backed 
companies already adopted the Make–And–Buy strategy before receiving venture funds. Second, the 
percentage of firms adopting the Make–And–Buy strategy increases (to 77%) after receiving venture 
funds. Moreover, analysis of the transition matrix shows that 16 out of 18 companies remain with the 
Make–And–Buy strategy after receiving venture funding, and 7 of the 8 other venture-backed companies 
that change strategy move to adopting Make–And–Buy. This result is inconsistent with the venture 
capital effect being one of pure selection. Rather, it supports the view that part of the correlation between 
venture capital and innovation strategies could come from venture capitalists pushing some of these 
companies to complement intramural R&D with the acquisition of external knowledge. In particular, 
venture investors have been shown to foster R&D cooperation among their portfolio companies, 
exploiting their network to identify appropriate providers of external knowledge (Lindsey (2008)).  
 
What do we conclude from the evidence we have presented? Our univariate tests and multinomial 
regression both point to venture capital being associated with a specific type of companies. These 
operate in high-tech industries and are more mature in terms of their technological development than 
companies that receive only public funds, as reflected in their stronger pre-financing patent endowment. 
Venture-backed companies are also larger, consistent with the focus of venture investors on companies 
that have already developed some commercial expertise. Finally, these companies focus on building up 
absorptive capacity. The pre/post comparisons suggest that these results are unlikely to be due only to 
selection.  
 
To interpret these findings, we consider that venture capital investors have a tightly defined investment 
horizon, around five years. Therefore, they need to select companies that can ‘grow up quickly,’ and 
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push them towards successful commercial maturation. Both the selection and the causal effect of venture 
capital are consistent with the need to take companies with a good growth potential and quickly bring 
them to maturity. This is different from public funds that are provided to innovative companies without 
a commercial goal and without a definite ‘payout’ horizon. It is therefore not surprising that this source 
of finance is focused also on the investment in internal R&D that is by itself a longer-term investment. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
We undertake several robustness checks. Table 7, Panel A and Panel B, reports the results of four 
additional regressions. For each multinomial model we report the marginal effects evaluated at the mean 
values of all independent variables. In the same way as in Table 4, we report the marginal effects of 
three innovation strategies in columns I, II, and III, with No-Make-No-Buy-Post being the omitted 
strategy.   
 
First, we consider that our data reflect strategy choices observed at different points in time. We therefore 
explicitly control for the time dimension of the data, and for the fact that we aggregate them over a 
different number of CIS waves. To this purpose, we build a set of 15 dummies, one for each possible 
combination of CIS waves.17  In our second robustness test, we replace the High-Tech dummy with 18 
industry dummies to better control for industry effects as potential drivers of innovation strategies. 
Third, we further exploit the information present in our patent data and build an alternative measure of 
patent quality, equal to the number of forward citations received by the EPO patent applications of the 
sample companies (see Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2007)). Finally, we run a multinomial logit instead of 
a multinomial probit for our benchmark specification of Table 4.  
 
Our results are remarkably consistent across all variations, both in statistical and economic terms. Like 
in Table 4, in all these specifications, the marginal effects of Venture-Capital are positive and significant 
only for Make-And-Buy, with the magnitude ranging between 13.6% and 17.2%, while the marginal 
                                                     
17 We therefore have dummies identifying whether the value of the dependent variable of a particular observation 
was built using only one, two, three, or all four waves, and taking into account all possible combinations. 
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effect for Make-Only is negative (though not significant). In contrast, the marginal effects of Public-
Funds are positive and significant for both Make-Only and Make-And-Buy.   
 
Finally, we also compute the marginal effects of all variables in Table 4 at the median values of the 
explanatory variables. The results are very close to those in the reported table.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze how the source of finance affects innovation strategies, focusing on the role of 
venture capital. We theorize that venture capital funds should be positively associated with an innovation 
strategy that can lead to a relatively fast commercial maturation of the company. We identify such 
strategy in the build-up of absorptive capacity through both internal and external R&D. We test our 
hypothesis with a unique, hand-collected database of over 10,000 Dutch companies and find supportive 
evidence. Companies that receive venture capital finance are associated only with the Make-And-Buy 
innovation strategy that corresponds empirically to the build-up of absorptive capacity. This result is 
consistent across several specifications and econometric models. We also find some evidence suggesting 
that the correlation we document is not purely due to a selection effect.  
 
The strategy and policy implications of our results are potentially important. From a strategy perspective, 
our results imply that companies that seek venture capital need to develop a technology base that 
prepares them to quickly incorporate external technology, and that venture capital investors further push 
their companies towards the incorporation of external knowledge. 
 
From a policy perspective, our results imply that innovation and entrepreneurship policies should take 
into consideration that providing support for the venture capital industry can help investments in 
companies that adopt innovation strategies likely to generate commercially mature products and services 
within a short period. At the same time, one has to be aware of the limitations that come from the 
relatively short investment horizon of venture investors (see Arvanitis and Stucki (2014)).  Importantly, 
venture investors are unable to finance very long-term projects in which public institutions or non-profit 
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organizations may be more interested. These entities have little time pressure, so they can support 
companies that appear able to develop successful technology without much concern to immediate 
commercial viability. Moreover, while not-for-profit funding tends to be stable over time, Gompers and 
Lerner (2000) document the cyclicality of venture investments, which often leads to over- and under-
investment. 
Finally, since our study is the first to analyze the relationship between sources of funding for 
entrepreneurial companies and their innovation strategy, it naturally points to research issues that need 
further attention. Among them, we point to the inclusion of additional sources of finance, like business 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
This Table reports the name, definition, mean (frequency for dummy variables), and standard 






Venture-Capital Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has received venture finance; 0 
otherwise 0.015 0.124
Public-Funds Dummy equal to 1 if the company received public funds (tax credits, grants, 
subsidized loans, loan guarantees) from national or European agencies, in any 
CIS wave it took part in; 0 otherwise 0.309 0.462
Company age Age of the company, in years, at the time of its first venture financing (if venture-
backed), or at end of the first CIS survey it has responded to (if non venture-
backed) 17.1 12.5
Sales Company turnover in the last year of the first CIS wave it took part in (in million 
euros) 96.8 1,329.5
Patents-EPO Number of patent applications filed with the EPO in the six years up to 1998 (or 
before the first round of venture funding) 0.131 1.920
Patents-EPO-Citations Number of 3-year forward citations received by a company's patent applications 
filed with the EPO in the six years up to 1998 (or before the first round of 
venture funding) 0.060 1.050
Patents-Family-Size
Number of patents filed with the EPO that are also filed with non-EPO patent 
offices in the six years up to 1998 (or before the first round of venture funding) 0.860 19.628
High-tech industry Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company operates in the following NACE 2-
digit industries: Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electronics, computer services, 
R&D services; 0 otherwise. 0.148 0.355
 
B. Innovation Activities
Make Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company engages in intramural R&D in any 
CIS wave it took part in; 0 otherwise. 0.622 0.485
Buy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company purchased extramural R&D or other 
know-how, including licensing of patents or of non-patented inventions, as well 
as other types of externally-generated knowledge in any CIS wave it took part in; 
0 otherwise 0.457 0.498
C. Innovation Strategies
No-Make-No-Buy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company did not engage in either Make nor 
Buy activities in any CIS wave it took part in; 0 otherwise 0.292 0.455
Buy-Only Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company engaged in only in Buy activities in 
all CIS waves it took part in; 0 otherwise 0.085 0.279
Make-Only Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company engaged in only in Make activities in 
all CIS waves it took part in; 0 otherwise 0.251 0.433
Make-And-Buy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company engaged in both Make and Buy 
activities in some of the CIS waves it took part in; 0 otherwise 0.372 0.483
D. Innovation Outcomes
IPR-Protection-Application Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company applied for protection of its 
intellectual property rights in the form of a patent, trademark, copyright or 
industrial design in any of the CIS waves it took part in; 0 otherwise 0.315 0.464
Sales-Product-New-to-Market Fraction of the sales of the company from products and services new to the 
market (i.e., introduced before the company's competitors). This is computed as 
the maximum percentange in any of the CIS waves the firm took part in; 0 
otherwise 0.077 0.155
Sales-Product-New-to-Firm Fraction of the sales of the company from products and services new to the firm 
(i.e, introduced when already present in the market). This is computed as the 






Table 2: Innovation outcomes 
This Table reports the frequency of the four innovation strategies. For each innovation strategy, the 
Table also reports the share of sales from products that are new to the market, the share of sales from 
products that are new to the firm, and the frequency of applications for IPR protection. All variables 






























No-Make-No-Buy 29.25% 4.34% 11.95% 15.21%
Buy-Only 8.52% 4.22% 11.27% 18.73%
Make-Only 25.06% 8.10% 16.80% 30.36%
Make-And-Buy 37.16% 10.72% 19.91% 47.94%
Total 100% 7.67% 16.07% 31.51%
Observations 10,371 10,184 10,359 9,605
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Table 3: Univariate analysis 
This Table reports univariate comparisons between venture-backed companies (column I) and (i) 
companies that receive public funds but no venture capital (column II), or (ii) other companies (column 
III). Panel A reports company characteristics, strategies, and innovation outcomes. Panel B reports data 
on pre-existing patent variables. Variables are defined in Table 1. For each variable we separately report 
the median (frequency for dummy variables, means for patent data) and standard deviation. All variables 
(columns and rows) are defined in Table 1. For each variable, we also perform two tests of whether the 
median (mean) of the venture-backed group is statistically different from (i) the median (mean) of the 
Public-Funds-Only group and (ii) the median (mean) of the Other group. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.   
PANEL A:  
COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS, INNOVATION STRATEGIES, AND INNOVATION 
OUTCOMES 
                      
                      
  Venture-Backed Public-Funds-Only  Other 
   Obs: 161 Obs: 3,117  Obs: 7,093 
 Unit  of  Median St.Dev. Median St.Dev.   Median St.Dev. 
A.1. Company 
Characteristics measurement                   
Company age (years) 13.0 12.84 16.0 12.64   14.0 12.46 
Sales (€m)  28.76 96.71 19.1 2,261.00 *** 8.66 578.72 *** 
High-tech industry (dummy) 0.348 0.478   0.215 0.411 *** 0.114 0.317 *** 
   
A.2. Innovation Strategies                     
No-Make-No-Buy (dummy) 0.087 0.283 0.083 0.276  0.389 0.487 *** 
Buy-Only (dummy) 0.031 0.174 0.036 0.187  0.108 0.310 *** 
Make-Only (dummy) 0.217 0.414 0.289 0.453 ** 0.234 0.424 
Make-And-Buy (dummy) 0.664 0.474 0.591 0.492 * 0.268 0.443 *** 
   
A.3. Innovation Outcomes                     
IPR-Protection-Application  (dummy) 0.662 0.474 0.480 0.450 *** 0.226 0.418 *** 
Sales-Product-New-to-
Market (fraction) 0.060 0.203 0.050 0.178 * 0.000 0.139 *** 
Sales-Product-New-to-Firm (fraction) 0.200 0.256   0.110 0.242 * 0.050 0.213 *** 
   
PANEL B:  
PRE-EXISTING PATENT VARIABLES 
                     
                      
  Venture-Backed 
Public-Funds-
Only  Other 
  Obs: 161 Obs: 3,117  Obs: 7,093 
  Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.   Mean St.Dev. 
Patent Variables               
Patents-EPO (number) 0.863 3.183 0.341 3.369 ** 0.022 0.363 *** 
Patents-EPO-Citations (number) 0.329 1.391 0.165 1.858  0.008 0.207 *** 
Patents-Family-Size (number) 3.416 14.280   2.317 35.090   0.162 4.022 *** 







Table 4: Multivariate Analysis 
This Table reports results from the multinomial probit regression discussed in Section 4. The dependent 
variables are the innovation strategies. The baseline strategy is No-Make-No-Buy-Post. All variables 
(columns and rows) are defined in Table 1 and in Section 4.2. For each independent variable, we report 
the marginal effect, evaluated at the mean of all explanatory variables, and in brackets, the corresponding 
standard errors. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
  
Venture-Capital -0.029 -0.016 0.168 ***
[0.022] [0.038] [0.044]
Public-Funds -0.070 *** 0.064 *** 0.288 ***
[0.005] [0.01] [0.011]
Patents-Family-Size -0.027 ** -0.002 0.102 ***
[0.013] [0.014] [0.015]
Sales 0.004 ** -0.022 *** 0.045 ***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Company age 0.004 0.001 -0.019 ***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
High-tech -0.039 *** 0.123 *** 0.086 ***
[0.007] [0.014] [0.015]










Table 5: Multivariate Analysis − additional models 
This Table reports results from multinomial probit regressions. The dependent variables are the 
innovation strategies. The baseline strategy is No-Make-No-Buy-Post. All variables (columns and rows) 
are defined in Table 1 and in Section 4.2. The models reported are discussed in Section 4.2. The ‘Young 
and small companies’ columns report marginal effects from the regression of Table 4, where the effects 
are computed at the 25th percentile for company age and size, and at the median for all other explanatory 
variables. In the ‘Old and large companies’ columns, the effects are computed at the 75th percentile for 
company age and size, and at the median for all other explanatory variables. For each independent 
variable, we report the marginal effect, and in brackets, the corresponding standard errors. The symbols 












Marginal effect Marginal effect Marginal effect Marginal effect Marginal effect
Marginal 
effect
Venture-Capital -0.024 -0.016 0.160 *** -0.032 0.006 0.175 ***
[0.030] [0.039] [0.044] [0.033] [0.035] [0.046]
Public-Funds -0.064 *** 0.092 *** 0.287 *** -0.080 *** 0.064 *** 0.305 ***
[0.005] [0.01] [0.011] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011]
Patents-Family-Size -0.023  -0.017 0.086 *** -0.030 * 0.010 0.099 ***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.018] [0.013] [0.015]
Sales 0.007 *** -0.013 *** 0.036 *** 0.007 *** -0.014 *** 0.040 ***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Company age 0.003 -0.002 -0.016 *** 0.004  -0.001 -0.019 ***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
High-tech -0.036 *** 0.156 *** 0.095 *** -0.044 *** 0.134 *** 0.108 ***
[0.009] [0.014] [0.013] [0.010] [0.014] [0.015]
Number of Observations 10,366 10,366
Chi-square 1,918.4 1,918.4
p-value 0.000 0.000
Make-And-Buy-PostBuy-Only-Post Make-Only-Post Make-And-Buy-Post Buy-Only-Post Make-Only-Post
Young and small companies Old and large companies
I II III I II III
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Table 6: Pre/Post venture financing analysis 
This Table reports the frequency of innovation strategies for the 30 companies for which we have 
information both before and after the first round of venture capital financing. All strategies are defined 




Frequency of innovation strategies 
 I II 
 Pre-VC Post-VC 
No-Make-No-Buy 2 1 
Buy-Only 2 1 
Make-Only 8 5 
Make-And-Buy 18 23 






















Table 7: Robustness − additional models 
This Table reports results from multinomial probit regressions. The dependent variables are the 
innovation strategies. The baseline strategy is No-Make-No-Buy-Post. All variables (columns and rows) 
are defined in Table 1 and in Section 4.2. The models reported are discussed in Section 5. Panel A 
reports results from a regression which includes fixed effects for the wave structure of the CIS data, and 
a regression that includes individual industry fixed effects. Panel B reports results from a regression that 
uses forward citations as a measure of patent quality, and a regression that uses a multinomial logit 
model instead of a multinomial probit model. For each independent variable, we report the marginal 
effect, evaluated at the mean of all explanatory variables, and in brackets, the corresponding standard 
errors. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 







Venture-Capital -0.029 -0.007 0.136 *** -0.030 -0.021 0.169 ***
[0.023] [0.039] [0.045] [0.021] [0.038] [0.044]
Public-Funds -0.073 *** 0.072 *** 0.289 *** -0.059 *** 0.049 *** 0.273 ***
[0.005] [0.01] [0.011] [0.005] [0.01] [0.011]
Patents-Family-Size -0.027 ** -0.001 0.091 *** -0.022 * -0.009 0.096 ***
[0.013] [0.014] [0.016] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015]
Sales 0.003 ** -0.017 *** 0.038 *** 0.002 -0.019 *** 0.049 ***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Company age 0.004 0.005 -0.028 *** 0.006 ** 0.001 -0.016 ***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
High-tech -0.038 *** 0.122 *** 0.086 ***
[0.007] [0.014] [0.015]
CIS wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 10,366 10,366
Chi-square 3,816.9 3,737.3
p-value 0.000 0.0
















Venture-Capital -0.030 -0.021 0.167 *** -0.030 -0.019 0.172 ***
[0.022] [0.037] [0.044] [0.021] [0.038] [0.045]
Public-Funds -0.071 *** 0.062 *** 0.291 *** -0.071 *** 0.063 *** 0.287 ***
[0.005] [0.01] [0.011] [0.005] [0.01] [0.011]
Patents-Family-Size -0.032 * 0.004 0.109 ***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.018]
Patents-EPO-Citations -0.046 0.042 0.270 ***
[0.423] [0.047] [0.054]
Sales 0.004 ** -0.022 *** 0.045 *** 0.003 ** -0.024 *** 0.048 ***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Company age 0.003 0.001 -0.018 *** 0.003 0.002 -0.020 ***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
High-tech -0.040 *** 0.123 *** 0.088 *** -0.041 *** 0.120 *** 0.087 ***
[0.007] [0.014] [0.015] [0.007] [0.014] [0.015]
Number of Observations 10,366 10,366
Chi-square 1,908.3 2,356.7
p-value 0.000 0.000
Multinomial LogitPatent Forward Citations
I II III I II III
Make-And-Buy-PostBuy-Only-Post Make-Only-Post Make-And-Buy-Post Buy-Only-Post Make-Only-Post
